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I. INTRODUCTION
Lies, it has been thought, have in themselves no First Amendment value* The
Supreme Court has famously maintained, more broadly, that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact."' This language has frequently been
repeated by the Supreme Court itself and by other courts. Elsewhere, the Court
has maintained that "[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless; they
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas."'1
Distinguishing among different kinds of false statements of fact, the Court has
argued that "[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues."
The intentional lie and the careless error are said to be "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." 6
C 2011 R. George Wright. Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Thanks, along with complete exculpation, are owed
to Rick Garnett, Ron Rotunda, Rod Smolla, Lawrence Solum, Mark Tushnet, Rob Vischer,
Eugene Volokh, and the editors of the Utah Law Review.
' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). But see Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("[T]here can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately
inform the public about lawful activity.").
2 E.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 783 n.3 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 482 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
See, for example, the especially interesting factual and legal context of the "Stolen
Valor" Act case of United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206, 1212 n.12 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 181 L. Ed. 2d 292 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210) (statutory
criminalization of the false oral or written claim to have been awarded a particular military
service medal). One example of the numerous other federal and state court opinions
quoting the Gertz language is Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 616 (6th
Cir. 2009).
4 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
s Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).6 Id. at 340 (quoting Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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Thus any free speech protection accorded to false statements of fact-let
alone to intentional lies 7-is justified on pragmatic, merely instrumental grounds,
rather than as a matter of principle. For the sake of avoiding "intolerable self-
censorship"'8 and the excessive deterrence of requiring entirely true speech, "we
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."9 This protection is
ultimately a matter of judicial calculation and strategy, 0 given the risks and
uncertainties faced by good-faith speakers. It is said that some lies need to be
protected in order to provide "breathing space"" for uninhibited, good faith,
responsible speech.
In the end, though, we are left with the near-truism that lies in themselves
have no free speech value, beyond their negative free speech value in polluting and
distorting public disclosure. 2 Ironically, this belief, however popular, is itself
false.
The falsity of the claim that lies are inherently without direct and substantial
free speech value is the main thesis of this Article. Lies may contribute directly
and substantially to the basic values or purposes underlying freedom of speech in
general.13 These include, but are not limited to, autonomy, personal development,
truth, privacy, tolerance, respect, dignity, and equality. Some lies may promote
free speech values in such a way as to deserve free speech protection.14 And this is
quite apart from any "breathing space" 5 that protecting some false statement-if
not some lies-might provide for good faith speakers.
Part II of this Article examines a recent, intriguing example of an alleged lie
in a legal context drawn from a variety of related false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, or perjurious statements. As it turns out, it is an understandable wish to
be able to analytically place all lies somewhere on a simple continuum, but that is
doomed. As a concept, lying is a matter of astounding subtlety and complexity. It
is probably more accurate to think of lies, collectively, as occupying positions on a
nearly infinite gradient. That gradient, in turn, constitutes only a portion of a
further, nearly infinite gradient necessary to locate the full variety of lies, false
For clarification of the admittedly vague idea of a 'lie' that is sufficient for our
purposes, see infra Part III.
8 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
9 Id. at 341.
'o Id. at 342.
" See id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
1 For reference to widely cited free speech values or purposes, see infra Part IV.
14 Even assuming a lie's value in promoting freedom of speech, whether it should be
constitutionally protected from any legal penalty will often depend upon the nature of the
regulation and the weight of any countervailing government interests. For a general
discussion of content-based restrictions on speech, see Erwin Chemerinksy, The First
Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 199 (1994).
15 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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statements, fraudulent statements, misleading statements, deceptive statements,
and perjurious or other related sorts of statements.
Part III of this Article provides background to identify some general
alternative perspectives on lying, and to add rigor and precision to the discussion.
First, the work of some of the most influential writers on the subject of lying are
sampled,' 6 including the classic historical discussions of the nature and value-or
disvalue-of lying.' 7 Second, attention is devoted specifically to the influential
work of philosopher Immanuel Kant.' 8 Finally, some of the very careful analytical
and normative work of contemporary writers is reviewed, including philosophers,
law professors, and social scientists-as well as some current disputes over the
very definition and meaning of lying.'9 Comments in this section apply the ideas of
these different thinkers on the fugitive slave and Shoah cases described below.
Part IV is the emotional center of the Article. It recounts clear instances of
intentional lying to both private parties and government officials in two dramatic
and extreme, though clearly important, historical contexts.2 0 The first involves
intentional lies in the context of attempts to re-capture and "return" escaped
fugitive slaves throughout the period ending with the American Civil War
("fugitive slave cases"). 2 ' The second involves intentional lies, mainly to Nazi
governmental or military officials, in the context of attempts to hide or otherwise
protect mostly Jewish citizens from being sent to concentration and extermination
camps over the course of the Second World War ("Shoah cases").22
Part V discusses the basic values and purposes thought to be promoted by,
and to thereby justify, a regime of freedom of speech.23 Specifically, the discussion
addresses whether a number of the lies, on any familiar definition,24 told in the
fugitive slave and Shoah cases could quite reasonably be described as distinctly
advancing one or more of the basic free speech values and purposes. Indeed, in
16 See infra Part III.
1 See infra Part III.A.
1 See infra Part III.B.
19 See infra Part III.C. As we shall see, however, it will not be crucial for our purposes
whether we have correctly interpreted the work of any writer, including Kant, or even
whether we arrive at a precise, detailed, or consensually convincing definition of lying. For
our purposes, almost any plausible definition of lying, drawn from among the many
possible candidates, should suffice to make our key points.
20 See infra Part IV. Our references to "intentional" lying probably involve a logical
redundancy, but reference to intentional or deliberate lies may sometimes add emphasis, if
not clarity.
21 See infra Part IV.A.
22 See infra Part IV.B.
23 See infra Part V.
24 It is sometimes suggested that a lie told to someone who has no moral right to be
told the truth is not a justified lie, but is simply, not a lie at all. This approach begins with
the murky idea of forfeiting the right to the truth, or at least the right to not be lied to. It
does not correspond especially well with our ordinary usages and strikes many of us as
mainly an expedient intended to save a supposedly absolutist and morally disturbing rule
against lying. See infra Part III.
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many of the examples considered, this is consistently the case. This Article
concludes that lying in such cases, taken individually or collectively, often
substantially advances several of the basic free speech values.25 The general
conclusion will also apply to closer calls in related, but less extreme contexts. In
summary, this Article will establish that some intentional lies, in themselves, are
worthy of protection on free speech grounds.
II. LYING AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS IN LEGAL CONTEXTS:
AN INTRIGUING CASE
It would. seem the law's regulation of lying and related sorts of
communication occurs in nearly every general legal context-civil and criminal.26
A particularly interesting constitutional controversy currently drawing judicial
attention involves a federal criminal statute known as the "Stolen Valor Act."2 7
The Act provides in part,
[w]hoever falsely28 represents himself or herself, verbally29 or in
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
25 See infra Part VI.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) (finding conviction for
making a false statement to a federally insured bank does not require a showing of the
materiality of the statement at issue). For the legal consequences of undercover journalistic
investigations involving multiple forms of alleged deception-beyond that of say, mere
real estate "testers"-see Food Lion, Inc., v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510
(4th Cir. 1999) (alleged use of false identities, references, and addresses by investigative
reporters); Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995) (alleged promise of
no "undercover surveillance"). For the generally defamatory quality of a published
assertion that a person is "a liar," see Colvard v. Black, 36 S.E. 80, 81-82 (Ga. 1900). For a
discussion of the general federal criminal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, see, for
example, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993) ("A witness testifying under
oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives false testimony concerning a material
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory."); United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 715-16
(7th Cir. 2010) (perjury case involving ambiguity of language); see also State v. Elnicki,
105 P.3d 1222, 1234 (Kan. 2005) (finding prosecutor's references to the defendant as a
'liar' or related euphemisms as improper). For some relevant commentary, see Tristan S.
Breedlove, Perjury, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 903-13 (2009); Stuart P. Green, Lying,
Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud,
and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 159-60 (2001); Steven R. Morrison, When Is
Lying Illegal? When Should It Be? A Critical Analysis of the Federal False Statements Act,
43 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 111, 145-46 (2009) (describing lying by various actors in the trial
process).
27 See Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006)).
28 Note that the statutory text makes no reference to whether the speaker must have
known or intended the representation to be false. See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b). The majority of
scholars would probably hold that a false statement not known by the speaker to be false
1134 [No. 3
LYING AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States ... or any colorable
imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.30
Interestingly, the statute does not require, in an individual case, a showing of
any particular harm to any person or group, including to those authorized to wear
the medal in question, to medal recipients in general, or to anyone somehow
competitively disadvantaged by the defendant's false representation. 3 ' As indicated
by Congress, "the purpose of [the Act] is to 'protect the reputation and meaning of
military medals and decorations."' 32
Presumably, the main congressional concern in omitting any required
individualized proof of harm is the belief in a diffuse pollution, dilution,
devaluation, or symbolic but cognizable injury, long-term in its nature, with the
gradually cumulating harms not realistically traceable to any particular defendant's
false representation. In this context, however, the Ninth Circuit has concluded:
The sad fact is, most people lie 33 about some aspects of their lives from
time to time. Perhaps, in context, many of these lies are within the
government's legitimate reach. But the government cannot decide that
some lies may not be told without a reviewing court's undertaking a
thoughtful analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by such
government interference with speech.34
In this case, the panel majority was concerned about the possibility of
criminalizing a wide range of commonly told lies. 35 They found no well-
would not, in most typical cases, count as a lie in a strict, rigorous sense. See infra Part
III.C.
29 While verbal communication can take place in writing, or electronically, this
statutory reference to "verbal" representations is probably intended to refer mainly to oral
representations. See THE NEW FOWLER'S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 820-21 (H.W. Fowler
& R.W. Burchfield eds., 3d ed. 1996).
30 18 U. S. C. § 704(b).
31 See id; United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 181 L. Ed. 2d 292 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210).
32 United States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238 (D. Nev. 2010) (decided
two days after the release of the opinion in Alvarez, and adopting a contrasting approach to
the free speech issues); see also Carri Geer Thevenot, Man Sentenced to Prison for
Military Benefits Fraud, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 2010, at Bl, available at
www.lvrj.com.
3 Again, not all provably false assertions of matters of fact are lies in any rigorous
sense. See supra note 28 and infra Part III.
34 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
3 See id. at 1217. Some possible purposes of lying include:
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying We lie
to protect our privacy ("No, I don't live around here"); to avoid hurt feelings
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36established, narrow class of legally unprotected lies to be present, and they found,
perhaps controversially,37 that the Stolen Valor Act's restriction on speech was
content-based rather than content-neutral. 3 8 The court applied strict scrutiny39 and
struck down the statute under the free speech clause.40
The primary concern herein is not with the proper disposition of such cases.
Instead, it is merely one of noticing recurring themes, including that of the state of
mind, knowledge, and intentions of the speaker, as well as any significant
interests-particularly in the form of free speech values and purposes-on either
side of the case.
Following this concrete introduction to lying and freedom of speech, this
Article will now turn to a broader sampling of some of the best-known thinking on
the very nature, moral qualities, and consequences of lying in various contexts.
("Friday is my study night"); to make others feel better ("Gee you've gotten
skinny"); to avoid recriminations ("I only lost $10 at poker"); to prevent grief
("The doc says you're getting better"); to maintain domestic tranquility ("She's
just a friend"); to avoid social stigma ("I just haven't met the right woman"); for
career advancement ("I'm sooo lucky to have a smart boss like you"); to avoid
being lonely ("I love opera"); to eliminate a rival ("He has a boyfriend"); to
achieve an objective ("But I love you so much"); to defeat an objective ("I'm
allergic to latex"); to make an exit ("It's not you, it's me"); to delay the
inevitable ("The check is in the mail"); to communicate displeasure ("There's
nothing wrong"); to get someone off your back ("I'll call you about lunch"); to
escape a nudnik ("My mother's on the other line"); to namedrop ("We go way
back"); to set up a surprise party ("I need help moving the piano"); to buy time
("I'm on my way"); to keep up appearances ("We're not talking divorce"); to
avoid taking out the trash ("My back hurts"); to duck an obligation ("I've got a
headache"); to maintain a public image ("I go to church every Sunday"); to
make a point ("Ich bin ein Berliner"); to save face ("I had too much to drink");
to humor ("Correct as usual, King Friday"); to avoid embarrassment ("That
wasn't me"); to curry favor ("I've read all your books"); to get a clerkship
("You're the greatest living jurist"); to save a dollar ("I gave at the office"); or
to maintain innocence ("There are eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop").
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (order denying rehearing en
banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1988) (1953) (discussing nearly twenty-six
different "language games").
36 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217-18.
37 For a sense of the inescapable murkiness and controversy involved, see generally R.
George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations
of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (2006).
38 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
39 Id. For one possible, less demanding, approach, see generally the draft card burning
case of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (assuming only an incidental effect
on the content of the speech).
40 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217. But see id at 1218 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citing, among
other cases, the language from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
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This sampling will help to provide perspective for the legal arguments and
conclusions throughout the Article.
III. THE BEST THAT HAS BEEN THOUGHT AND SAID ...
ON THE SUBJECT OF LYING
A. Some Classic Views on Lies and Lying
For purposes of this brief historical survey, the relevant writings are
approached semi-chronologically. The overall results may suggest a partial and
uneven drift away from an earlier absolutist moral condemnation of lies and
lying.4 1 But it is just as fair to say that for quite some time, and up to the present
day, many varieties of more absolutist and less absolutist views about lying have
co-existed.
Among the earliest reflections recorded in the Prasna Upanisad, a Sanskrit
text consisting of six questions and their answers, are that persons themselves
"wither" in some important sense when they lie.42 More positively, in Hinduism,
there is the Brahman, the supreme and universal Spirit underlying all phenomena,
and the image of "that stainless world of Brahman in whom there is no
crookedness, no falsehood or deceit.'A3 And in more directly binding language,
there is the fourth of the five fundamental Buddhist moral precepts: "I undertake
the precept to refrain from speaking falsely."4 In these philosophies, a lie to an SS
officer or slave hunter by someone sheltering fugitives would not be acceptable or
moral, even if the lie saves lives.
4' The term "liar" is unfortunately ambiguous in a distinctive way. The term may be
used to emphasize someone's character-as in a penchant for prevarication and
mendacity-in the form of a disposition over time. But the term may of course also refer to
someone who had lied on only some single, specific occasion. See, e.g., VI THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 235 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1933), under the entry "liar"
(contrasting being "an untruthful person," which seems to go to habit, disposition, or
character, with "one who tells a falsehood," which seems more focused on a single act or
instance).
42 UPANISADS 286 (Patrick Olivelle trans., 1996) (responding to question 6).
43 Id. at 280 (question 1); see also THE LAWS OF MANU 87 (Wendy Doniger & Brian
K. Smith trans., 1991) ("A man should tell the truth and speak with kindness; he should not
tell the truth unkindly nor utter lies out of kindness. This is a constant duty."). It is unclear
whether fugitive slave or Holocaust sheltering cases can be contained within the scope of
the idea of "kindness."
" DAMIEN KEOWN, BUDDHIST ETHICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 9 (2005).
Presumably this precept is not intended to (equally) bar all innocent and conscientious but
ultimately false assertions on matters of fact. See MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 71
(Maxwell Staniforth trans., 1964) (stating "[t]o what, then, must we aspire? This, and this
alone: the just thought, the unselfish act, and the tongue that utters no falsehood," but
failing to address possible severe conflicts internal to this question).
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In the Western tradition, Plato's characterization of Socrates advocates, in
describing the ideal polis, what is often translated as a "noble lie"A5 regarding the
relationships among citizens. The "noble lie," however, is plainly intended as a
sort of parable or allegory conveying a deep truth.46 For our purposes, it is
misleading to think of this concept as interchangeable with lying.
One of the earliest and most interesting sustained treatments of lying is that of
St. Augustine, an absolutist. 4 7 Augustine offers both analytical and normative
points, and even posits the case-akin to our contemporary "Stolen Valor"
cases 4 8 -- of someone who claims, "that he has served with the army . . . in Persia,
though he never set foot out of Rome."49
Augustine's absolutist stand against lying ultimately relies on his well-known
theological premises. Summarily, "[s]ince . . . by lying eternal life is lost, never for
any man's temporal life must a lie be told."50 Augustine thus extends the
prohibition of lying to cover even cases of lying aimed at the spiritual, and not
merely the temporal good of another person." On these controversial theological
assumptions, we might wonder whether a lie told to a young SS officer near the
close of World War II might-lovingly-help save the officer's immortal soul.
Augustine's absolutism certainly does not go untested. He recognizes that
there are limits to our ability to spontaneously devise not lies, but clever and
effective deceptions to protect innocent persons-whose hiding place we know-
from would-be murderers,52 as in the SS cases.53 Yet Augustine must counsel
betrayal, if necessary, rather than lying in such a case, again on theological
grounds.5 4 As one contemporary examination of Augustine's approach has it,
"[1]ies, for Augustine, are . . . deliberately duplicitous verbal claims-no matter
what their effects. . . . Some lies will have good effects; others will have bad ones.
45 THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 106 n.1 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1990) (Francis
MacDonald Comford trans., 1945).46 d
47 See AUGUSTINE, ON LYING [DE MENDACIO] (Kevin Knight ed.) (H. Browne trans.,
1887) (395), available at www.newadvent.org/fathers/1312.htm (last visited July 26,
2011), Augustine's Retractions, book I, last chapter.
48 See supra Part II.
49 AUGUSTINE, supra note 47, 1 18.
50 id. 9.
51 See id. 11.
52 See id. 12-14, 22-25.
1 See infra Part IV.B.
54 See AUGUSTINE, supra note 47, 42 ("[T]hose testimonies of Scripture have none
other meaning than that we must never at all tell a lie . . . . [U]nto eternal salvation none is
to be led by aid of a lie."). For a more skeptical view, see LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS
45 (Leonard Tancock trans., Penguin ed. 1982) (1665) (maxim number 63) ("Aversion
from lying is often a hidden desire to give weight to our own statements and invest our
words with religious authority.").
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None of this is relevant . . . to considering whether the lie is ever appropriate or
defensible."
It is hard to imagine that a free speech analysis would change Augustine's
mind on the morality, regardless of the legality at civil or criminal law, of some
instances of lying. Even Augustine seems to concede that, on some occasions,
failing to lie can have plainly bad consequences and that lying may be the only
way to obtain plainly good consequences obtainable in no other way.56 Whether
some of these good consequences can take the form of the basic values underlying
freedom of speech is another question, 7 as is the real moral or constitutional
weight of such consequences. But Augustine has, quite realistically, made some
important concessions to our ultimate case.s
Thomas Aquinas, reflecting Augustine's influence, seems to retain
Augustine's absolutism, while elaborating on his main concession. Aquinas holds
in particular that
the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure
another, ... while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some
good-either of pleasure . . . or of usefulness, . . . whereby it is intended
to help another person, or to save him from being injured. . . . Now it is
evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying
diminished in gravity.59
To Aquinas, no less than to Augustine, the question is about someone who has
explicitly or implicitly promised sanctuary to a family of fugitive slaves, or to a
family hunted by the SS. The person who made the promise now faces an
unavoidable choice between the death of her own family and those relying on her
for safety (along with any effects on the presumably immortal souls of the hunters)
on the one hand. And on the other hand the sincerely intended outcome of the
safety of those she has promised sanctuary, along with the intended salvation of the
immortal souls of the hunters who were prevented from committing murder.6 0 The -
55 PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, LYING: AN AUGUSTINIAN THEORY OF DUPLICITY 38 (2004)
(Augustine recognizing that some lies "harm no one and provide some benefit"). Note also
the possible moral ambiguities of some lying in negotiation and bargaining contexts. See,
e.g., Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990);
Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1998).
56 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Part V.
58 See infra Part VI.
59 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, qu. 110, art. 2, respondio, at
1659 (Benziger Bros. ed. 1948) (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1920)
(emphasis added).
60 Imagine again that the hunters are young and inexperienced, though perhaps at
serious risk of impending death themselves as the Second World War concludes.
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latter outcomes may realistically be obtained only through a lie, as distinct from
61silence or any other clever verbal maneuverings short of lying.
Even in such circumstances, Augustine and Aquinas may wish to reject the
option of lying on moral or theological grounds. Yet it is hardly unreasonable to
take an accounting of the substantial benefits-personal, social, and
constitutionally cognizable-of a lie told in a profoundly loving spirit and with a
universally loving intention.
Essayist Michel de Montaigne exhibits a similar uncompromising and
absolutist spirit, expressed in more secular terms.62 Montaigne argues, "lying is an
accursed vice. We are men, and hold together, only by our word. If we recognized
the horror and gravity of lying, we would persecute it with fire more justly than
other crimes." 6 3 Montaigne here certainly makes a legitimate point, though perhaps
not strongly enough to justify his recommended criminal sanction. Language, and
the reliability of language, is not just a matter of coordination, efficiencies, or
avoiding unnecessary costs. Realistically, humans depend on faithfulness in
utterance even for survival and for the survival of civilization itself.
Montaigne's own analysis can, however, be stood on its head in the extreme
circumstances posed by our fugitive slave hunt cases, or the cases of those who
sought to protect Jews throughout the Shoah. Under the stress and unanticipated
demands of the moment, a person may well lack the wit to instantly devise a clever
response that is intentionally and grossly misleading, yet not quite a lie, that
successfully throws a suspicious fugitive slave-hunter, Nazi functionary, or just an
extortionist neighbor, off the trail.
Montaigne must then be confronted, with his own goals and valuations in just
such cases. Could it not be equally reasonable to argue that it is the speech of the
sanctuary-giver-whether intentionally deceptive or an outright lie-that best
upholds and defends the basic values of solidarity, community, mutual
consideration, and respect prized by Montaigne? 64 And does not the promotion of
these basic values approach some of the underlying logic and value of protecting
freedom of speech?65
Not all insightful writers on the subject of lying, however, have approached
the subject as absolute prohibitionists and without a sense of our inescapable
human weaknesses and limitations. Jonathan Swift, for example, dryly observes
6 We may also assume that a successful lie allows the sanctuary-giver to continue her
indispensible non-lying work of rescuing other persons from re-enslavement or violent,
horrific death, whereas anything short of a (skillful) lie ensures just such an immediate
death for the would-be protector herself, and perhaps her own entire family, leaving others
in desperate need of her assistance with no alternative.
62 Michel de Montaigne, Of Liars, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 21, 23
(Donald M. Frame trans., 1976) (1572-1574).
63 Id.
64 See id Do we really want to say that both the Nazi functionary and the sanctuary-
giver, whose lie is at least intended to send him away, undermine human solidarity and
community, just in different ways?65 See infra Part V.
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that "but though the Devil be the father of lies, he seems, like other great inventors,
to have lost much of his reputation by the continual improvements that have been
made upon him." 6 6 Much later, Mark Twain remarks on the universality of lying,
contrary to the spirit of Augustine:
The man who speaks an injurious truth, lest his soul be not saved ... ,
should reflect that that sort of a soul is not strictly worth saving. The man
who tells a lie to help a poor devil out of trouble is one of whom the
angels doubtless say, "Lo,. here is an heroic soul who casts his own
welfare into jeopardy to succor his neighbor's; let us exalt this
magnanimous liar."68
Memorable satire, such as Twain's, rarely endures where it is entirely without
insight and justification. 69
Before considering the philosopher Immanuel Kant's work on the subject of
lying,70 the views of his successors in the nineteenth century should be addressed.
They were, in fact, as divided on the subject of lying as Kant's predecessors. John
Henry Newman, for example, gravitates toward a generally absolutist moral
prohibition of lying, albeit with some rare exceptions. Newman considers, for
example, the following circumstances:
As to Johnson's case of a murderer asking you which way a man had
gone, I should have anticipated that ... his first act would have been to
knock the man down, and to call out for the police; and next, if he was
worsted in the conflict, he would not have given the ruffian the
information he asked, at whatever risk to himself. I think he would have
let himself be killed first. I do not think that he would have told a lie.
Assuming Newman is speaking of general ethics here, and not just assessing some
particular character, the question would be whether choosing one's own death
before lying would also be the morally, though hardly legally, required course if
the ruffian were instead intent upon stealing the anonymous victim's wallet. Is
death before lying also morally required in order to prevent a pickpocketing?
66 Jonathan Swift, The Art ofPolitical Lying, in THE PORTABLE SwIFT 156, 156 (Carl
Van Doren ed., 1986). See also the work of Swift's friend, DR. JOHN ARBUTHNOT AND
JONATHAN SWIFT (K. Tompkins ed., 1874).
67 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
68 Mark Twain, On the Decay of the Art of Lying, in THE COMPLETE HUMOROUS
SKETCHES AND TALES OF MARK TWAIN 503 (Charles Neider ed., 1985).
69 Cf Oscar Wilde, The Decay ofLying, in THE DECAY OF LYING AND OTHER ESSAYS
20 (2003) ("He [the liar] is the very basis of civilized society.").
70 See infra Part III.B.
71 JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA 329 (A. Dwight
Culler ed., 1956) (1864).
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Of course, given any hypothetical circumstance, one can always imagine
intervening events, however unlikely, that reduce the moral and other costs of not
lying. 7 2 For example, consider if the ruffian will also murder or re-enslave persons
who have placed their trust in the individual accosted by the ruffian, and that
silence, overpowering the ruffian(s), or summoning the police will save no one (the
ruffians may be the police).73
Newman's contemporary, John Stuart Mill, took a different view of the
matter, going so far as to suggest a moral duty to break the law in extraordinary
circumstances, such as to prevent the death of an innocent person.7 4 Several
decades later, the philosopher Henry Sidgwick noted the "Common Sense"75
attractiveness of lies in particular circumstances.76 Sidgwick's response was that
if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in any case be admitted, I do
not see how we can decide when and how far it is admissible, except by
... weighing the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment
of mutual confidence involved in all violation of truth.77
The important costs and benefits of such lies should be considered. As an
example on the cost side, the individual actor or the broader society must consider
not only the incremental erosion of mutual confidence, but also the moral costs of
any friendships betrayed by lying.79 As well as the all-too-human8 0 tendency for
the individual actor or broader society to falsely and self-servingly imagine that
our own circumstances conveniently fit within some exception to a rule.
The obvious and quite substantial moral benefits of "benevolent" lies should
also be taken into account. Among these benefits may be some of the basic values
that underlie freedom of speech in general.8 ' These considerations are expanded
upon next in the context of the work of Immanuel Kant.
72 Again, we merely assume here, along with most absolutists, a potentially morally
relevant difference between lying and various kinds of deception and intentionally
misleading speech held not to amount to a lie. See infra Part III.C.
" See infra Part IV.A-B.
74 See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 131, 200
(John Gray ed., 1991).
75 HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 316 (Hackett Pub. Co. 1981) (1874).
7 See id.
77 id
78 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
79 In the cases of primary concern to us, the moral cost of betraying the trust of slave-
hunters or SS officials will typically be near zero if not, in fact, less than zero.
80 For Nietzsche's distinctive take on lying, see FREDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON TRUTH AND
LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE (1873), available at www.e-scoala.ro/bibliotecal
friedrichnietzsche.html (last visited June 26, 2011).
81 See infra Part V.
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B. The Lessons ofImmanuel Kant on Lying
The modem philosopher most popularly associated with an absolutist moral
condemnation of lying is Immanuel Kant. Kant famously argues that a maxim, or
underlying descriptive principle, that allows lying whenever a lie is advantageous
could not be universalized. This would sabotage the credibility of assertions and
thus the meaningfulness and appeal of the cultural institution of making and paying
attention to verbal assertions. 8 2 Kant thus concludes that a household servant
would violate a duty to himself if, on the orders of the householder, the servant
were to lie to someone at the door about the presence of the householder.83
Could Kant's assessment change if the stranger at the door were clearly intent
upon re-enslaving or murdering someone under the protection of the householder?
Kant, to his credit, does not seek to draw some murky ad hoc distinction between
an inquirer who has a right to be told the truth, and one who does not.84 If a
suspicious stranger is at the door, we may well think of responsibilities,
consequences, or of rights generally-but thinking in terms of whether the person
standing before us does or does not have a "right to the truth" is likely to either beg
the question, or to merely restate the relevant moral considerations.
But could it not be argued, in Kantian terms, that even lying to a slave-hunter
or an SS officer at the door fails to respect their rationality or personhood?85 At
least to some degree, it could. But that concession also opens a number of other
possibilities. Could not a lie to a murderous SS officer also promote the rationality,
personhood, or dignity of that SS officer over the longer term? Is the SS officer
himself acting, in that instance or in general, on any universal Kantian maxim?
And is it not clear that a lie to the SS officer could promote the rationality and
personhood of the person answering the door, the householder, the householder's
own family, and anyone given sanctuary by the householder? Rational flourishing
and self-determination, meaningful freedom in choosing, and certainly the minimal
prerequisites to making such choices, including life itself, are crucially on the line
for all these people. And may be uniquely and directly promoted by a lie.
Ordinary experience shows us that people do in fact lie, with a variety of
motives, just as they breach legally binding contracts with some frequency,
82 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 89-90
(H.J. Paton ed. & trans., Harper & Row Pub. Co. 1964) (1785) (on what it means to
"promise" in particular); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 182-83 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797) ("(C]ommunication . .. that yet (intentionally) contain[s]
the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to
the natural purposiveness of the speaker's capacity to communicate his thoughts.").
83 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 82, at 184.
84 See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic
Concerns, in IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 425-30
(James W. Ellington ed., 3d ed. 1993).
85 For a discussion, see Alexander R. Pruss, Lying, Deception and Kant (Aug. 30,
2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/
LyingAndDeception.html (last visited June 26, 2011).
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sometimes for a benefit. 86 Reasonably frequent instances of lying have not, thus
far, plainly sabotaged the system of human communication through verbal
assertion. And it has never been obvious why we should focus, as Kant would have
it, on the alleged impossibility or the self-defeating goal of willing that everyone
lie in some, if not all, circumstances.
Nor does Kant himself seem insensitive to the consequences of absolutism in
this regard. At one point, Kant startlingly narrowed his definition of a lie: "[n]ot
every untruth is a lie; it is so only if there is an express declaration of my
willingness to inform the other of my thought."87 Perhaps Kant was responding to
the possibility of the villainous exploitation of a victim's refusal to lie. Kant
realistically acknowledges that "if, in all cases, we were to remain faithful to every
detail of the truth, we might often expose ourselves to the wickedness of others,
who wanted to abuse our truthfulness."88
Worse, though, is that a refusal to lie-and not just regarding matters of
detail 89 -might simultaneously expose oneself, one's family, those relying on
one's sanctuary, and conceivably even the interrogating officer himself to the
gravest physical or (if we include such considerations) spiritual harm. Stated in
positive terms, the beneficial consequences of such a lie could well encompass a
number of crucial free speech values. 90 Kant's focus on basic values, such as
autonomy, has of course been influential, but his application of such basic values
to lying seems mishandled.9'
86 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977).
87 IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 203 (Peter Heath et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1784-1785). Such situations might include, for example, the
voluntary taking of an oath.
" Id. at 204.
89 See id.
90 See infra Part V.
9' For a sampling of contemporary discussions of Kant on lying, see, for example,
THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 40 (1991) (generally sympathetic to
Kant's account, but granting that "[s]ometimes we need to lie to increase the chances that a
person will make his own decisions (and so live autonomously)"); CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 17 (1996) (recognizing that deceiving
others may undermine their freedom of choice, humanity, or status as an end-but not
sufficiently accounting for the freedom of choice of other directly affected parties, or for
the possibility that lying to a person may actually treat that person as an end, as one who is
infinitely worthy and who has a duty to respect the minimal human rights of innocents);
ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 45 (1989) (referring to Kant's "unsatisfactory resolution of dilemmas posed
by would-be murderers who ask for vital information"); ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S
ETHICAL THOUGHT 414 n.16 (1999) (sympathetically expounding Kant's position, while
conceding that on some occasions, lying might maximize self-perfection (or presumably
that of other persons)); David Sussman, On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness: Kant on
Lying in Self-Defense, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 225 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009);
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C. Some Contemporary Analyses ofLying
Contemporary philosophers have provided many careful discussions of the
concept and morality of lying. Among the most useful for our purposes is that of
Professor Joseph Kupfer.9 2 Professor Kupfer argues that in particular contexts,
some lies "are excusable and others justifiable." 93 Nevertheless, there is a
presumption against lying:
The first inherent disvalue is the immediate restriction of the deceived's
freedom. This . . . inclines the liar in the direction of disrespect for
people. The second inherent disvalue found in lying is the self-
opposition or internal conflict involved in speaking what one
disbelieves. This, in turn, contingently threatens the integration of the
liar's personality. 94
Professor Kupfer qualifies this picture by noting that a lie may be intended to
preserve and protect the legitimate freedom of the liar or another person-
presumably many others. 9 5 In addition, autonomy or self-determination of other
persons, as well as certain basic democratic governance and equality values, might
constitute or directly support basic free speech values.96
Kupfer also recognizes that a lie may enhance the freedom of the person lied
to, in the long run.97 But even Kupfer's own basic thesis statements may not hold
for all cases of lying. For instance, consider whether a lie to a fugitive slave-hunter'
or to an SS officer searching for Jews must immediately restrict the questioner's
freedom. Whether he is suspicious of the veracity of the response or not, the slave
hunter is presumably still free to continue to pursue his targeted victim if he so
chooses. The SS officer remains as free as before to conduct as thorough or
cursory a search as he wishes, as often as he cares to. It is difficult to see how a
lying response has genuinely limited the questioner's freedom in either case.98
James Edwin Mahon, The Truth About Kant on Lies, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION
201 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009); Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing
with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 325-349 (1986).
92 See Joseph Kupfer, The Moral Presumption Against Lying, 36 REV. METAPHYSICS
103 (1982).
93 Id. at 103.
94 d ,
95 See id. at 110.
96 See infra Part V.
97 Kupfer, supra note 92, at 108. Presumably, a parallel argument might be made
about self-realization and other free speech values as well.
98 But cf id. at 103 (noting the immediate restriction of the deceived person's freedom
as an inherent negative component of all lies).
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Nor is it obvious, in the examples of the fugitive slave-hunter and SS officer
that the lying answer reflects disrespect99 or denigrationloo for the various parties
directly affected, or even for the questioner himself. The lie may be instead
motivated by a sense of the equal or irreplaceable value and infinite dignity of
persons, or even by a genuine concern for the questioner's moral or spiritual well-
being.
Similarly, a lie to the fugitive slave-hunter or SS officer need not involve, on
the part of the speaker; any arrogance,tor or any breach of faith or trustl02 with a
(suspicious) questioner, and assuredly not with those the "liar" refuses to betray.
Nor need there be any treachery,' 0 3 cowardice,104 or self-indulgence 05 in such a lie.
Crucial to Professor Kupfer's analysis is the supposedly inherent disvalue of
"self-opposition or internal conflict"' 06 within the liar, perhaps even threatening the
disintegration of the liar's personality. 0 7 But anyone providing sanctuary to
innocent persons, who lies to a brutal authority figure about it, is likely to feel
immense conflict and stress-given the stakes for all those affected. Surely,
betraying helpless innocents in one's charge by telling the truth might well result
in lesser comparative conflict, long term stress, guilt, and remorse. Persons of
sound moral character might find, despite the enormous stress, that lying to the SS
officer at least allowed them to retain their fundamental moral integrity.
In contrast to Professor Kupfer's analysis, Professor Alasdair Maclntyre
insightfully suggests that our overall goal should be to protect truth in
relationships,s0 8 and that "the justified lies told to frustrate aggressors"1 09 may well
serve that goal, like truth-telling in more ordinary circumstances. This seems
entirely realistic and sensible. The protection and pursuit of the truth, it will be
shown, 110 counts as a basic value or goal underlying the protection of freedom of
speech.
9 See id.
'00 Seeid. at 113.
'1 See generally id. (describing lying as arrogant, as when one thinks too highly of
oneself).
102 See generally id. at 115 (citation omitted) (commenting that lying is essentially a
breach of faith).
103 See generally id. (explaining that lying is disrespectful to the person being
deceived and is thus a kind of treachery).
104 See generally id. at 125 (commenting that lying makes one give in to fear and thus
supports cowardice).
1os See generally id. at 126 (describing self-indulgence as an auxiliary of lying).
1o6 Id. at 103.
107id
108 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, TRUTHFULNESS, LIES, AND MORAL PHILOSOPHERS:
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM MILL AND KANT? 357 (Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
1994), available at www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/macintyre_1994.pdf
(last visited June 26, 2011).
109 Id P
110 See infra Part V.
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Professor MacIntyre's point can be applied to other basic free speech values
as well. Consider, for example, human fulfillment or self-realization."' Some
natural law theorists"l 2 counted Augustine" 3 and Aquinas"l 4 as influences, causing
their view to lean toward absolutism. Yet they also recognized the free speech
value of fulfillment-for self and for others affected by one's actions'1-as
crucial to a life well led."16 The examples of interrogations by fugitive slave-
hunters or SS officers will show that a lie has the potential, under such
circumstances, to promote overall human fulfillment distinctly better than telling
the truth.' '7 Indeed, it is difficult to see the betrayal of the escaping slaves or the
Jews as anything less than a betrayal of the most basic human values," 8 including
free speech values." 9 The next section of this Article considers some actual
historical cases that will help focus the examination of the morality of lying.
"' See infra Part V.
112 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIs, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 11
(1991); Gary Chartier, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics ofFalse Assertion, 51 AM.
J. JURIS. 43, 44 (2006); Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and the Moral Absolute Against
Lying, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 81, 82 (1996); Christopher Tollefsen, Lying: The Integrity
Approach, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 273, 273 (2007).
113 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, ON
EVIL (Brian Davies ed., Richard Regan trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1269-1272).
15 See, e.g., Chartier, supra note 112, at 43.
116 See id.
"' See infra Parts IV.A-B.
118 A complication might be raised by the case of a potential sanctuary-offerer who
gives clear, if quite unexpected, advance warning that under no circumstances will he lie to
a murderous SS officer, at least where there is possibly time for the pursued Jews to make
alternative arrangements for their safety. To actually betray those unsuspecting persons to
whom one has afforded sanctuary will strike many of us as neither admirable nor
principled, or as respectful of the rationality of the SS officer, but as manifesting an
astonishing incapacity for empathy, solidarity, civilization, and responsibility. But see
Tollefsen, supra note 112, at 281-82 (discussing the work of Germain G. Grisez, who
acknowledges the Nazi as part of the human community while also acknowledging the
Nazi's violation of the human community); Germain G. Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus,
2 LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 405, 407 (1993).
'l9 The insightful contemporary literature on the subject of lying is substantial. For
further examples, with an emphasis on philosophical literature, see SISSELA BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 84 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the claim that
some lies can actually promote the values of truth and veracity); THOMAS L. CARSON,
LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2010) (describing Carson's definition
of 'lying' as requiring an asserted falsehood and some vague subjective sense of falsity, but
not an intent to effectively deceive); id. at 85-86 (citing an instance of lying to save twelve
Jews during the Shoah); MARTIN JAY, THE VIRTUES OF MENDACITY: ON LYING IN POLITICS
67 (2010) (explaining that the would-be murderer threatening the innocent is not deserving
of the truth); SHELLEY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 108 (1998) (describing lying as
typically denying someone the information they need "to accomplish whatever it is they
wanted to accomplish"-which presumably could have involved moral abomination on any
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IV. LYING AND POSITIVE MORAL VALUE
A. Some Fugitive Slave and Slave-Hunter Cases
There is a historical context relevant to American slavery, fugitive slave-
hunting, and associated instances of lying. In Chief Justice Taney's recounting in
Dred Scott,12 0 before and during the time of the Constitution's drafting, even non-
slave or emancipated African-Americans did not generally count as equal persons,
or as Americans. They had, in Taney's words:
been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an
scale, or the denial of some of the basic free speech values); Jonathan E. Adler, Lying,
Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHIL. 435, 444 (1997); Christopher P. Guzelian,
True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L..REv. 669, 670 (2010) (arguing that "true scientific
speech and false scientific speech should each become a stand-alone First Amendment
speech category"); Arnold Isenbergh, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, 24 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 463, 466 (1964) ("A lie is a statement made by one who does
not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be lead to believe it."); James
Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and Deception, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.plato.stanford.edulentries/lying-definition/;
Frederick A. Siegler, Lying, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 128, 128 (1966); David Simpson, Lying, Liars
and Language, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 623, 623-24 (1992); Robert C.
Solomon, Self Deception, and Self-Deception in Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
DECEPTION 15, 17 (Clancy Martin ed. 2009) (responding to the basic argument that
dishonesty "deforms the liar and debases the currency of language" by saying: "Lies can
protect and inspire, and deception can serve noble ends"); Roy Sorensen, Knowledge-Lies,
70 ANALYSIS 608, 608-09 (2010) (discussing the mass-lying of the slaves claiming to be
Spartacus, and comparing the act of non-Jewish Danes wearing yellow badges to make
Nazi identification of Jews more costly); Roy Sorensen, Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without
the Intent to Deceive, 88 PAC. PHIL. Q. 251, 252 (2007); Alan Strudler, The Distinctive
Wrong in Lying, 13 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 171, 171-73 (2010) (asserting that
lying is commonly wrong in aiming "to breach a trust"); see also David Nyberg, Noble
Lies, Narrative Truths, and the Art of Voice: Thoughts on Pragmatic Language and the
First Amendment, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1203, 1205, 1210 (1996) (noting the apparent truth-
telling absolutism of RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF
DISCOURSE 214 (1996), but arguing that apparent lies in some cases of "extreme danger"
qualify not as morally justified lies, but simply not as lies at all). For discussion of the
related problem of public official sincerity, see Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason
Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010).
120 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 404-08 (1857).
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ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be
made by it.121
Of course, this dehumanization, and literal commodification, was not
universally endorsed by the broader society.' 2 2 For our purposes, the inherent
contradiction of slavery can be seen in the willingness of the slave-owner to think
of the enslaved person as both a mere article of merchandise 23 and as someone
who can be accused of an intentional act of lying. A commodity can at worst be
thought of as "defective." A commodity cannot, logically, be "accused" of
anything, let alone of some complex intentional act like lying.124
The historical debate over commodity status versus personhood status
demonstrates the enormous stakes at issue. For enslaved, previously enslaved, or
free blacks-indeed for all persons-the free speech values of self-realization and
of genuine political democracy, among others,125 were crucially at stake. The
gravity was noted in the well-known Schooner Amistad case,12 6 in which Justice
Story stated a key legal issue in the following terms: "[i]f these negroes were ...
lawfully held as slaves under the laws of Spain, and recognized by those laws as
property capable of being lawfully bought and sold; we see no reason why they
may not justly . . . be included under the denomination of merchandise."l2 7 In the
domestic fugitive slave context, the Supreme Court also separately considered an
indictment of "Willis Lago, free man of color."1 28 Per the indictment, Lago "did
... entice Charlotte, a slave,... to leave her owner and possessor, and did aid and
assist said slave in an attempt to make her escape from said owner and possessor,
against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky."l 29 One is
tempted to reply that no attempt to escape enslavement could possibly have been
contrary to the dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. But the narrower focus
here is on lying in the course of an escape from slavery.
'21 Id. at 407.
122 See, e.g., id at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting) (Even someone reduced to slavery "is
not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker" and possesses an immortal soul.).
For further general discussion, see, for example, Mark Graber, "No Better Than They
Deserve": Dred Scott and Constitutional Democracy, 34 N. KY. L. REv. 589 (2007).
123 See supra text accompanying note 121.
124 For some of the prerequisites of lying, and of the capacity to lie, see supra note
119.
125 See infra Part V.
126 United States v. Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (1
Pet.) 518 (1841) (In this case, the case caption itself went on to refer to the ship's tackle,
apparel and furniture, cargo, and a number of Africans-in that order.).
127 Id. at 593 (Justice Story rejecting the supposition in question).
128 In re Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (1 Black) 66, 68 (1861),
overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 224 (1987).
129 Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 539
(1842), as discussed in Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law,
34 AKRON L. REv. 261, 279-80 (2000); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen
Ways ofLooking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 49, 50 (2007).
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The noted Abolitionist and former slave Frederick Douglass had, by his own
admission, resorted to forgery1 3 0 and to oral lying' 3 1 when necessary to effectuate
or protect an escape from slavery. Such circumstances were not unusual. Harriet
Tubman, as well, utilized forged documents 32 and engaged in tactical
"disinformation" to avoid possible betrayals.13 3
It is not as though fugitive slaves or those assisting them thought lightly of
lying as a moral issue. Consider, for example, after not having seen her father for
five years, Harriet Tubman arranged a family meeting but insisted her father
remain blindfolded the entire time.' 34 The blindfolding would allow Tubman's
father to truthfully deny, as he did under later interrogation,' 35 that he had seen any
escaped members of his family within five years.13 6
Abolitionists, however, were plainly aware of the moral stakes in what we
would today call issues of "transparency." Consider, for example, the general
conclusion reached by Frederick Douglass:
I would keep the merciless slaveholder profoundly ignorant of the means
of flight adopted by the slave. . . . Let him be left to feel his way in the
dark; let darkness commensurate with his crime hover over him. . . . Let
us render the tyrant no aid; let us not hold the light by which he can trace
the footprints of our flying brother. 37
At least at this broad level of generality, as well as in specific circumstances,13 1
Douglass recognizes the complex moral status of various forms of deception, when
otherwise unavoidable.
Throughout the historical annals of the Underground Railroad more generally,
people commonly had to resort to various forms of deception-from clever
evasions and misrepresentations to overt lying, including the use of shipping
crates,'3 deceptive intimidation,14 0 elaborate acting and identity misstatement,' 4'
130 See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:
AN AMERICAN SLAVE 78 (Oxford ed. 1999) (1845) (discussing his forged travel
authorizations).
... See id. at 81 ("We all denied that we ever intended to run away.").132 CATHERINE CLINTON, HARRIET TUBMAN: THE ROAD TO FREEDOM 94 (2004).
'13 See id. at 89.
134 See id. at 96.
'3 See id.
136 See id.
1 See DOUGLASS, supra note 130, at 89.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 130-13 1.
1 See WILLIAM STILL, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD: AUTHENTIC NARRATIVES
AND FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS 24-25 (Ian Frederick Finseth abr. ed. 2007) (1872)
(recounting the interstate shipping of William Peel in 1859).
140 See id at 100-01 (describing bold seizure of the initiative from slave-hunting
officials).
141 See id at 108-09.
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artful deception, 142 and disguises, some involving the use of opposite-gender
clothing. 143 The precise forms of deception in the cause of freedom can be as
varied as the opportunities and constraints posed by varying circumstances, and
generated by the highly motivated, if not sometimes desperate, human imagination.
In the fugitive slave context, examples of lying could be multiplied indefinitely.
One further case, fictional but evocative, comes from the pen of Mark
Twain.144 In a classic scene of conscience and morality from the novel The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huck and Jim's raft is approached by armed men
searching for recently escaped slaves so they can secure the attendant reward. With
precocious subtlety, Huck deftly leads the slave-hunters to conclude-by offering
pleas and evasions to the contrary-that "family members" aboard his raft are
victims of a smallpox contagion. 14 5 The slave-hunters, gulled by Huck, ironically
counsel him to lie at his next opportunity for assistance,146 and with equal irony-
given their mercenary aims in slave-hunting-charitably give Huck twenty gold
pieces to help his "family," who consists only of the fugitive slave Jim.14 7
Like Tubman, Huck's lying does not pass unexamined by his own moral
conscience. Huck "knows" that lying to protect his friend Jim was morally
wrong.148 Huck guiltily attributes his lying in this case to bad socialization,14 9 if not
to his inherent cussedness. However, in Huck's case, though the medieval
scholastic distinction between a trained, fallible, and specific "conscientia"' 50 and
the reliable guidance of a broader "synderesis"'" would actually seem more
appropriate-Jim's own reaction, quite justifiably, is far less ambivalent.15 2
142 See id at 123 (giving the example of vocal imitation-presentation of self-in the
dark as a threatening dog in order to deter searchers).
143 See id at 123-25 (accompanied by prevarication as to identity). For a similar
account of the ruses of William and Ellen Craft, from the year 1848, see James Oliver
Horton & Lois E. Horton, A Federal Assault: African Americans and the Impact of the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179-80 (1993).
144 See MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 89-91 (Bantam
Classic ed. 2003) (1884).
145 See id at 90.
146 See id
147 See id at 90-91.
14 8 See id. at 91.
I49 See id
1so See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, qu. 94, art. 1 (Kevin Knight
online ed. 2008) (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1920), available at
www.newadvent.org/summa.
151 See id.
152 See TWAIN, supra note 144, at 91.
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B. Lying to the Nazis to Save Innocent Person-
and for the Sake of Other Basic Values
When it happens to suit its purposes, no entity can be more hostile to hearing
lies than a totalitarian government.' 53 Certainly, the SS's antipathy to being lied to
in the course of detecting, tracking down, imprisoning, and murdering innocent
Jews, and others, is well established.154
On rare occasions, extraordinary quick-wittedness, under immense stress,
allowed a person giving sanctuary to Jews to respond to the SS in an intentionally
misleading way, but without technically lying. This rather subtle distinction is
often celebrated. The philosopher Peter Geach, for example, reports that
[a] Dutch woman whom the Nazis suspected of hiding Jews told the
officer who questioned her that there were Jews under the table: there
were in fact Jews under the table-under the floorboards. The Nazi
official took her remark as a mere piece of cheek and enquired no
further.ss
This woman may be congratulated for her extraordinary quick-wittedness,
well beyond the capacities of most people under these horrific circumstances. We
may even speculate that those persons habitually unwilling to lie may have a more
highly developed capacity for non-lying deceptiveness.156 However, our
admiration for her moral fastidiousness may be tempered if the focus is on the utter
dependency of the hidden Jews on her voluntarily extended protective sanctuary,
and the risks of harm to them and to her own family.
The woman in question took an unnecessary chance in skirting the boundary
of lying. It might not have been clear how an already suspicious Nazi interrogator
would have taken such an oddly flippant response. What if he had already
suspected that Jews were being hidden, perhaps even under the floorboards,
somewhere in the house? Or if he had detected an unexpected edge of nervousness
mixed with the woman's insouciance? What if he had decided that such
impertinence deserved the reward of ripped-out floorboards? Of course, there was
no guarantee that the outright lie to the Nazis would have accomplished its aim of
protection. Fortunately, here, the woman's adroit verbal gamesmanship actually
15 See, for example, O'Brien's injunction to the hapless Winston Smith: "If you tell
me any lies, or attempt to prevaricate in any way, or even fall below your usual level of
intelligence, you will cry out with pain, instantly. Do you understand that?" GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984, 202 (1983 ed.).
154 See, e.g., infra sources cited throughout Part IV.B. THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 235 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (1933).
' PETER GEACH, TRUTH AND HOPE 53 (2001).
156 As suggested by Geach. Id. at 57.
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managed to preserve and promote all of the crucial moral values at stake.s 7 Still,
there does seem to be an obligation to avoid unnecessary risk of betrayal and harm
to those helplessly in one's benevolence, and to one's own family. At the very
least, a timely, advanced stipulation to all those concerned that one will not lie-
even to save innocent lives-seems minimally appropriate.
Suppose, as well, that the SS is aware that the person being questioned will
not lie. Then, the questioning SS officer could ask the "suspect" a series of similar
or related questions, relying on that person's inability to concoct a series of
deceptions that neither raise suspicion nor amount to outright lies. If it has been
"publicized" that a particular morally transparent person will not lie, the SS officer
could be especially alert for a slightly quirky, oddly phrased, or idiosyncratic
answer, paying special attention to what is literally conveyed or withheld.
A public reputation for refusing to lie might thus invite exploitation. When
pressed, such a respondent would likely adhere to principle and betray those
dependent upon her protection, invite suspicion through silence or
unresponsiveness, or ultimately collapse for practical purposes the distinction
between lying and not lying. One could, in the extreme case, even say, "there are
no Jews here." Nearly all language, after all, is to some degree ambiguous. 58
Neither "Jew" nor "here" are self-defining. The speaker could, within limits,
choose her own intended meaning. But it becomes unclear why any such linguistic
deviousness is qualitatively better than some sort of lie.
It is time to reflect on the basic values, attributable to freedom of speech or
not, at stake in lying to the Nazis-with particular attention to those values that
might actually be promoted by lying. Although both the fugitive slave cases and
the Shoah cases obviously posed exceptional moral dilemmas, such instances may,
in some respects, provide exceptional illumination as well. Other less extreme
cases will also implicate the basic free speech values, perhaps to a diminished
degree.
Certainly, those who sought to rescue or protect Jews otherwise destined for
extermination found that they often had to adapt to unusual moral and
psychological circumstances. As one scholar has written, "[t]hey needed to learn
now to be cunning and clever, how to lie and deceive." 59 This does not mean that
everyone lied to the Nazis when trapped in horrific circumstances.' 60 But
' For the sake of the argument, we shall simply assume that an intentionally
deceptive statement does no more violence to truth, or to trust, or to open communication
as a stable system, than any form of lying.
158 See, e.g., David R. Dow, The Confused State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas,
35 S. TEX. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994).
'9 DAVID P. GUSHEE, RIGHTEOUS GENTILES OF THE HOLOCAUST: GENOCIDE AND
MORAL OBLIGATION 112 (Paragon House 2003) (1994); see also EVA FOGELMAN,
COURAGE AND CONSCIENCE: RESCUERS OF JEWS DURING THE HOLOCAUST 68, 80, 81
(1994).
160 Viktor Frankl reports that in Auschwitz, "I generally answered all kinds of
questions truthfully. But I was silent about anything that was not expressly asked for."
VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 54 (Ilse Lach trans., Beacon Press
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frequently enough, under such circumstances, lying took on something of a
morally imperative character.
Some such lies were fundamental. The prolific rescuer Irena Sendler writes
that
"[s]ome Jewish mothers would spend months preparing their children
for the Aryan side [outside the Warsaw Ghetto]. They changed their
identities. They would say: 'You're not Icek, but Jacek. You're not
Rachela, but Roma. And I'm not your mother, I was just the
housemaid."
Or consider the encounter of the young Elie Wiesel-at the actual age of
fifteen-with the infamous Dr. Mengele at Auschwitz:
We continued to walk until we came to a crossroads. Standing in the
middle of it was . . . the notorious Dr. Mengele. He looked like the
typical SS officer: a cruel, though not unintelligent face, complete with
monocle. He was holding a conductor's baton and was surrounded by
officers. The baton was moving constantly, sometimes to the right,
sometimes to the left. In no time, I stood before him. "Your Age?" he
asked, perhaps trying to sound paternal. "I'm eighteen." My voice was
trembling. . . . "Your profession?" Tell him that I was a student?
"Farmer," I heard myself saying.16 2
And under more mundane circumstances:
German Quaker rescuer Olga Halle leaped into the role of "dear relative"
when Nazi guards searched the train on which she and an elderly Jewess
were traveling. Halle chatted with guards, but her companion was
speechless. Thinking quickly, Halle told the guards she was taking her
deaf relative to Berlin. The guards wished her a pleasant journey.163
2006) (1946). Under some circumstances, a variety of non-lying deceptions could be of
value. See, e.g., THOMAS KENEALLY, SCHINDLER'S LIST: A NOVEL 229-30 (Touchstone
1993) (1982) (recounting one man's deliberately prolonged losses at chess to protect
Jewish prisoners from a particularly sadistic officer).
16' ANNA MIESZKOWSKA, IRENA SENDLER: MOTHER OF THE CHILDREN OF THE
HOLOCAUST 75 (Witold Zborohowski-Koscia trans., Praeger 2011) (2004); see also YAFFA
ELIACH, HASIDIC TALES OF THE HOLOCAUST 7 (Vintage Books 1988) (1982) ("Shraga,from this moment on, this Jew standing here next to you is your father.").162 ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT 29 (Marion Wiesel trans., Hill & Wang ed. 2006) (1958).163 FOGELMAN, supra note 159, at 74-75. For an instance of a joint, albeit
spontaneously coordinated, deception based on a writing and compounded with an oral lie,
see ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 29-31 (Otto H.
Frank & Mirjam Pressler eds., Susan Mossotty trans., Bantam Books 1997) (1947) (entry
of August 14, 1942).
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Sometimes lying took the form of forgery or substitution of official documents.
There could, of course, be no guarantee that lies told to the Nazis would be more
than temporarily effective,1 65 if at all. 16 6 The comprehensive, detailed effect of
these lies is beyond our present scope.' 67 Against the background of the
previously-cited examples, the next section will make more explicit the ways in
which lying can uniquely promote the values of and the basic reasons for
protecting freedom of speech.
V. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE AND HOLOCAUST EXPERIENCES:
LYING AND THE REASONS FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH
While emphases vary, the basic reasons and purposes for constitutionally
protecting the freedom of speech are fairly well established. Professor Kent
Greenawalt's listing of these reasons,168 while more extensive than most, is
otherwise fairly representative. Professor Greenawalt recognizes, as significant
free-speech values: "autonomy and personality development," 69 the "recognition
of autonomy and rationality" in other people;o70 promotion of the discovery of
truth;' 7 ' the proper functioning of a liberal political democracy;17 2 promoting
tolerance and mutual respect; 7 the "exposure and deterrence of abuses of
164 See, e.g., MARTIN GILBERT, THE RIGHTEOUS: THE UNSUNG HEROES OF THE
HOLOCAUST 114 (Owl Books 2004).165 See FRANK, supra note 163.166 See GILBERT, supra note 164 (discussing the torture to death of an unknown parish
priest who repeatedly denied sheltering a young Jewish girl who, thanks in part to the
priest's dying efforts, survived the War).
167 For an exceptionally valuable documentation of the plainly limited extra-legal
attempts to save the lives of Jews, see generally MORDECAI PALDIEL, THE RIGHTEOUS
AMONG THE NATIONS: RESCUERS OF JEWS DURING THE HOLOCAUST (2007) (focusing on
150 of the 21,310 persons granted, as of January, 2006, the title "Righteous Among the
Nations" by Yad Vashem's public commission). For a thoughtful examination of the place
of moral rules and standards in the context of the camps, see TZVETAN TODOROV, FACING
THE EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 241-44 (Arthur Denner &
Abigail Pollak trans., Metropolitan Books 1996) (1991).
168 See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
119 (1989).
19 Id. at 143.
70 d. at 150.
1' See id. at 130-32; see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth
as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
172 See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 145-46.
'73 See id. at 146-47; see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 175-212
(1988).
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authority"; 174 the protection of vital privacy interests (through speaking or freely
declining to speak);175 along with considerations of "dignity and equality."1 76
The first of these values-that of autonomy, personality development, or self-
realization, 177-has been presented by Professor Frederick Schauer in the
following terms:
The argument is based on the proposition that a person who uses his
faculties to their fullest extent, who is all that it is possible to be, is in
some sense better off, and in an Aristotelian sense happier, than those
whose development is stultified. . . . What is seen as the ultimate goal for
man is the fullest use of the capacity to think, the greatest degree of
mental exertion, the exploration of the limits of the mind.178
Depending on the context, one may or may not wish to emphasize purely cognitive
considerations when thinking of autonomy and self-realization.
One motivation for lying to escape slavery, for example, might be that of
seeking to promote one's autonomy by escaping enforced illiteracy and the
cabining of one's cognitive powers within the narrow confines of slave labor. But
in many ordinary cases, as Professor David A. Strauss observes, 179 lying may
jeopardize the autonomy of the person successfully lied to, by interfering "with a
person's control over their own reasoning processes."180 The person lied to may
feel disrespected,' 8' or more like a manipulated instrument of the liar's will rather
than a person.' 82 And the effects of lying are in a sense even worse if the victim is
never in a position to recognize that he or she has been lied to, and thereby treated
in the above fashion.' 83
174 See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 130, 140-42; see also Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
175 See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 147-48.
176 Id. at 152-53. For some classic rhetoric bearing upon the basic purposes of free
speech, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), as
well as JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859). For an exceptionally concise and influential account of some of the
most fundamental free speech values, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE
EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970) (listing "individual self-fulfillment," "advancing knowledge and
discovering truth," "participation in decision making by all members of society," and
"maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus").
177 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
1s FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 54 (1982).
179 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 334, 353-55 (1991).
sOId. at 354.
181 See id
182 See id
183 See id.
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Professor Strauss recognizes, though, that there may well be special
circumstances in which lying is not morally wrong. 184 And certainly, in many of
the cases discussed here, the fugitive slave hunter or SS interrogator will be keenly
aware, in advance, of the possibility of being lied to. That possibility is already
built into their thinking. Many processes of reflection involve overcoming various
communicative obstacles. It is not obvious how lying to the interrogator must
interfere with the interrogator's control over his thinking and reasoning. A
perceived lie may certainly re-direct or complicate that thinking or reasoning
process. A more thorough search of the house, for example, may be ordered.
In the extreme cases, there would be something morally, if not logically, odd
about a slave hunter's or an SS interrogator's complaint that a lie has left the
interrogator feeling disrespected, manipulated, and instrumentalized. This is closer
to madness than to consistent logic. Would the idea be that in minimally
instrumentalizing the slave hunter, one has thereby impaired his ability to utterly
re-instrumentalize the fugitive slave? How much respect for the sheltered Jews
does he show by executing them upon detection?
In fact, in some such cases, could the lie not reflect the liar's reasonable
attempt to prevent the interrogator from forfeiting his status as a conscientious
moral agent, if not also from jeopardizing his presumed immortal soul? Imagine,
again, a young Nazi officer at the end of the Second World War. Whatever his
degree of guilt or complicity otherwise, if the officer is successfully deceived, he is
spared any direct involvement in killing. If, on the other hand, he is not
successfully lied to, he summarily executes the innocent Jews in sanctuary, along
with the members of the sheltering family. From a broader, post-war perspective,
what might even that young Nazi officer have ultimately preferred?
If we factor in the autonomy or self-realization and personal development
over time of both the sheltered Jews or fugitive slaves, along with that of the
sheltering actor and his or her family, any serious concern for these values may
well counsel, rather than prohibit, the crucial lie. It is not just crudely maximizing
autonomy among the directly affected persons; the value of autonomy is being
taken seriously here, in the most meaningful way. For example, ending the life of a
discovered Jewish child hardly respects their autonomy and developmental
potential. And again, the extreme cases upon which we focus for clarity do not
exhaust the broader range of more common cases in which similar conflicts exist.
Or consider the value of promoting the discovery of truth.'8 5 Unquestionably,
to lie to anyone, including an interrogating slave hunter or Nazi officer is,
ordinarily, to fail to further the interrogator's true understanding of where his
innocent quarry may be found. But on the other hand, such a lie (at least where
184 See id. For further brief discussion of Professor Strauss, see Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central. Complex, and Somewhat Curious
Relationship, 53 UCLAL. REv. 1107, 1113-14 (2006).
18 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In unusual cases, as in FRANK, supra
note 163, certain truths can be conveyed even if the contextually "necessary" lies are
ultimately unsuccessful. Even in the case of Anne Frank, though, her diary required some
undisturbed time for its composition.
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successful), may over time promote the moral truths of the real consequences of
slavery-ethnic and religious extermination, and genocide. Also to be factored in
are such truths that the liar, the liar's family, and the sheltered slaves or Jews might
later have discovered and perhaps shared. To obstruct the social systems of chattel
slavery or Nazism, insofar as either amounts distinctively to a truth-suppressive
institution, furthers the promotion of the truth.
On at least some similarly modest scale, but with equal moral importance and
clarity, lying to a slave hunter or to an interrogating Nazi also promotes the basic
free speech values of the promotion of liberal democracy, 8 6 tolerance and mutual
respect,187 and the restriction of abuses of power.18 8 It is possible to argue that
lying to the SS fails to display tolerance for, and respect of, the SS. It is likely that
the SS will respond to the truth, or even to an unsuccessful lie or deception, by
murdering the relatively tolerant liar and the hidden Jews. Such murders
necessarily foreclose any act of tolerance or respect by the victims over the course
of a natural lifespan. And we might well speculate that becoming a mass murderer
of the innocent may impair, rather than promote, any future movement of an SS
officer in the direction of tolerance and mutual respect. 89
Or consider, finally, the free speech values of promoting certain relevant
privacy interests, 190 and of dignity and equality.'91 Can we say, with any real
conviction, that lying to the slave hunter or the SS officer has, overall, adverse
effects on these free speech values? Or even hopelessly indeterminate mixed
results? A successful lie, and even an unsuccessful lie, strikes a blow in such cases
for the vital privacy interests of those given sanctuary and of the sheltering family.
The interrogator's own privacy interests seem negligible. And a lie to the
interrogator counts just as directly as a defense of the equal dignity of the person-
contrary to the ideologies of slavery and of Nazism-as almost any other speech
we can imagine. Neither slavery nor Nazism was, in contrast, willing to tolerate
such values in the realm of speech or action.192 And again, this will all be true, if to
a lesser extent, in less extreme circumstances.
186 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
18 Cf LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957)
(hypothesizing that people who hold inconsistent opinions often engage in rationalization
to reduce the dissonance, making them less likely to confront their opinions and engage in
real change).
'90 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
192 This overall argument for the free speech value of lying under these and similar
circumstances neither takes issue with, nor relies upon, the argument that the benefits of a
government's restricting false factual claims, or even lies, are outweighed by the costs of
allowing biased and fallible governments to attempt to do so. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The
First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 22 (2008) (arguing it is better to allow Holocaust denial than to attempt to cleanse
the world of deniers through government mandate); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where's the
Harm? Free Speech and The Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1099
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VI. CONCLUSION: LYING AND THE PROMOTION OF BASIC FREE SPEECH VALUES
Most typically, and in cases akin to the "Stolen Valor" example of lying about
receiving a military medal, 193 constitutionally protecting the lie is unlikely to
substantially promote any of the basic reasons for protecting speech in general.194
As we have seen,195 there are also many important cases, extreme and less extreme,
in which an intentional lie, on its own, can clearly "pay for itself' in terms of
advancing basic free speech values-without reference to problems of legally
distinguishing intentional lies from other false statements of fact. Lying can thus
substantially and directly advance the basic reasons for protecting free speech.
This result should not be surprising. Granted, a confrontation with a slave
hunter or an SS officer typically involves unusually high moral stakes. But the
realm of ordinary, private, low-stakes conversation also hints at the same
conclusion in its own limited way. A relative who asks, "do you think I look nice?"
may permissibly be told, technically, an intentional, reassuring lie in response. No
special moral credit would be given to someone who (riskily) answered that
question in a deceptive, cleverly evasive way, without technically lying.
It is possible to say that a "lie" in such a case is not really a lie at all, at least
where the relative is really more interested in reassurance than in a cold, forthright
analysis. Subtle cultural conventions may come into play. Would-be murderers
may have forfeited the right to be told the truth but it is far more of a stretch to
argue that the potential killer cannot, logically, be lied to at all. The would-be
murderer is a communicating person, and wants the truth. A justified lie under
such circumstances-whether justified on free speech grounds or not-remains a
lie.
We cannot avoid the task of considering the effects of a lie, or of a broad class
of lies, on the basic reasons for protecting freedom of speech. In a number of cases,
lying promotes those reasons, perhaps in ways sufficient to justify some variable
degree of protection under the free speech clause. In such a case, or class of cases,
the degree of free speech protection permitted for the lie will largely reflect the
moral weight of the various interests at stake.
In particular, the scope of the argument here-that lying can be
constitutionally protected-is not confined to cases involving the physical defense
(2008) ("Once Holocaust denial is regulated, it seems that regulation of any sort of
historical revision is but a short step away.").
It should be pointed out, though, that in the context of Holocaust denial or
minimization, and very loosely analogous historical claims, the term "lies" is often used in
a broader sense than we have employed above, in which the disseminator of (objectively
baseless and unjustified) false factual claims may propagate a "lie" he or she believes to be
true, by however tortured or irresponsible a process of motivated inquiry and judgment.
193 See supra notes 3, 27-40 and accompanying text.
194 This is not to say that the Stolen Valor Act could not be criticized or even struck
down from some other perspective, apart from those grounds on which we focus herein.195 See supra Parts IV.A-B.
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of self or others. Lying, of any categorical sort-say, check-kiting-could, under
the right circumstances, substantially advance one or more of the basic free speech
values. The law should be appropriately sensitive, as plausible cases arise, to
arguments for the free speech value of the lie in question. The law certainly should
not declare all lies to be without free speech value, or to possess at best only
indirect, instrumental free speech value. Nor should the law try to confine
instances of lies with substantial free speech value to one or more discrete
categories, as in the defense of self or others. Lies with substantial free speech
value, whether ultimately worthy of constitutional protection or not, could arise in
a variety of contexts, and the law should be sensitive to this possibility.
